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Integrated Reporting and Directors’ Concerns about Personal Liability Exposure: Law 
Reform Options  
 
Abstract  
Integrated Reporting (<IR>) holds significant promise as a new reporting paradigm that is 
holistic, strategic, responsive, material and relevant across multiple time frames. However, its 
uptake in Australia is being hampered by directors’ concerns about personal liability 
exposure, particularly for forward-looking statements that subsequently prove to be 
unfounded. This article seeks to illuminate the bases for these liability concerns by outlining 
the similarities between <IR> and the Operating and Financial Review requirements under 
the Corporations Act, and the relevant grounds for liability for misleading and deceptive 
disclosures, and breach of directors’ duties. In light of this discussion, this article proposes 
four possible reform options, ranging from minor adaptations to the <IR> Framework to far-
reaching reforms of the Corporations Act. As assurance is desirable to ensure that reliance 
can be placed on Integrated Reports, the development of a legal safe harbour for auditors of 
forward-looking information is also canvassed.  
 
 
 
Part I:  Introduction 
There is growing international momentum for companies to voluntarily adopt the Integrated 
Reporting (<IR>) Framework, which was released in December 2013.1 <IR> arose in 
response to the perceived limitations of current corporate reporting practices, including issues 
                                                            
1 International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC), “<IR> Framework” (2013) 
http://www.theiirc.org/international-ir-framework/ viewed 9 October 2014; KPMG, “Operating and Financial 
Reviews: Application of ASIC’s Regulatory Guide” (2014) 
http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Better-Business-
Reporting/Documents/operating-and-financial-reviews-2014.pdf viewed 9 October 2014. 
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of ‘clutter’ resulting from growing reporting requirements, and disclosures that fail to meet 
investors’ needs.2 The aim of an integrated report is to drive and provide a concise, holistic 
account of company performance by indicating a comprehensive range of financial as well as 
human, intellectual, environmental and social factors that impact on a company’s short, 
medium and long term capacity for value creation. An integrated report should provide 
transparency around the dynamics of the business model and associated risks and 
opportunities that may emerge. This should include a clear vision of the company’s business 
model, the way that the organization’s performance and sustainability is aligned with its 
strategy, analysis of the impacts and the interconnections of material opportunities’ risk and 
performances, and the resulting governance model. The IIRC envisions that the integrated 
report may, in time, serve as ‘the next phase in the evolution of corporate reporting’, which 
incorporates but goes beyond the types of information currently reported in companies’ 
financial statements.3  
 
There is a multiplicity of potential internal and external benefits for companies as a result of 
engaging with <IR>,4 which has underpinned the business community’s support for the <IR> 
Framework in other parts of the world.5 There is also increasing regulatory interest in <IR>. 
                                                            
2 See, eg, United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council, “Cutting Clutter: Combating Clutter in Annual 
Reports” (2011) https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/8eabd1e6-d892-4be5-b261-b30cece894cc/Cutting-
Clutter-Combating-clutter-in-annual-reports.aspx viewed 9 October 2014. 
3 IIRC, above n 1. 
4 Adams S, Fries J, and Simnett R, “The Journey toward Integrated Reporting” (2011) Accountants Digest 558; 
Eccles R, Cheng B, and Saltzman D (eds), “The Landscape of Integrated Reporting” (Harvard Business School, 
Boston (Ebook)); Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa (IRCSA), “Framework for Integrated 
Reporting and the Integrated Report: Discussion Paper” (2011) 
http://www.sustainabilitysa.org/Portals/0/IRC%20of%20SA%20Integrated%20Reporting%20Guide%20Jan%20
11.pdf viewed 9 October 2014; Dhaliwal D, Zhen L, Tsang A, & George Y, “Voluntary Non-Financial 
Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting” (2011) 
The Accounting Review 86(1) 59; Zhou S, “The Capital Market Benefits of Integrated Reporting” (2014) 
unpublished PhD thesis, School of Accounting, UNSW.  
5 For example, there are more than 100 participants in the <IR> Pilot Programme: see 
http://www.theiirc.org/companies-and-investors/pilot-programme-business-network/. KPMG notes that of the 
51% of companies worldwide that produced corporate social responsibility reports in 2013, one in ten claimed 
to publish an integrated report: KPMG, “Corporate Responsibility Reporting Survey 2013” (2013)  11-2 
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South Africa became the first jurisdiction to mandate <IR> in 2010, following the 
prescriptions of the influential King III report.6 Mandatory reporting rules in Europe,7 and 
stock exchange listing rules in, inter alia, Sao Paulo, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and 
Copenhagen,8 also require companies to report on environmental, social and governance 
issues, reflecting elements of <IR>. 
 
Integrated Reporting is still voluntary in Australia and, compared to their counterparts from 
other jurisdictions, Australian business leaders have been particularly outspoken regarding 
their concerns about the increased risk of directors’ liability for forward-looking statements in 
integrated reports. These views were evidenced in responses to the Consultation Draft of the 
International <IR> Framework in July 2013,9 and in the lead up to the release of the <IR> 
Framework in late 2013.10 The Australian business community’s strong concerns about <IR> 
have led to a perception of a slower uptake of the <IR> Framework in Australia.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.kpmg.com/au/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/pages/corporate-responsibility-reporting-
survey-2013.aspx viewed 9 October 2014. Further, the 571 companies of the 4046 that used the Global 
Reporting Index framework in 2013 self-claimed that their reports were ‘integrated’: Global Reporting Index 
(GRI), “Sustainability disclosure database” (2014) http://database.globalreporting.org/pages/about viewed 9 
October 2014. 
6 King Committee, The King Report on Governance for South Africa (Institute of Directors in South Africa, 
2009) http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/king3.pdf viewed 2 February 2015.    
7 European Parliament. “Texts Adopted” (2014) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0368&language=EN&ring=A7-2014-0006#BKMD-68 viewed 2 February 2015.  
8 International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), “April Newsletter” (2013) 
http://www.theiirc.org/2014/04/30/april-newsletter-2/ viewed 2 February 2015. 
9 Chartered Secretaries Australia (CSA), “Consultation Draft of the International <IR> Framework” (2013) 
http://www.theiirc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/143_Chartered-Secretaries-Australia.pdf last viewed 9 
October 2014; Business Council of Australia (BCA), “Submission to the International Integrated Reporting 
Council regarding the Consultation Draft of the International Integrated Reporting Framework” 
http://www.bca.com.au/docs/820E1D0F-2FF0-47CF-87F0-148942401B67/submission-to-the-consultation-
draft-of-the-internatoinal-integrated-reporting-framework_19072013.pdf viewed 9 October 2014; Australian 
Institute of Company Directors (AICD), “Integrated Reporting Draft Raises Director Liability Concerns” (2013) 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/The-Boardroom-Report/Back-
Volumes/Volume-11-2013/Volume-11-Issue-8/Integrated-reporting-draft-raises-director-liability-concerns 
viewed 9 October 2014.  
10 Drummond S, “Integrated Reporting Brings Legal Worries”, Australian Financial Review (17 April 2013) 
http://www.afr.com/f/free/markets/capital/cfo/integrated_reporting_brings_legal_RvN24L7rPruGI4M90qe4dI 
viewed 9 October 2014; Drummond S and King A, “Confusion just one of the Hurdles for Integrated 
Reporting”, Australian Financial Review (27 November 2013) 
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A key issue that has been the subject of growing concern in the Australian business 
community is directors’ potential personal liability for forward-looking disclosures.12 The 
<IR> Framework, which includes ‘strategic focus and future orientation’ as one of its 
Guiding Principles,13 has drawn attention to the issue of directors’ sign-off on forward-
looking information. The types of forward-looking information contained in integrated 
reports are likely to be welcomed by investors as they provide information with which 
investors can make judgments about companies’ future profitability.14 However, one 
significant obstacle in Australia to engagement with, and uptake of, <IR> is directors’ 
reluctance to sign off on integrated reports due to personal legal liability concerns. Directors 
are increasingly concerned about the legal environment in which they operate. Australia is 
witnessing the rise of shareholder class actions supported by litigation funding, making this 
jurisdiction a fertile ground for class action litigation.15 A major law firm has noted that 
directors and other officers and professional advisors are being increasingly targeted not only 
by class action plaintiffs but by the defendant companies as they seek to spread liability.16 
Concerns, arising from such a high risk profile, have underpinned renewed calls for greater 
liability protection for directors taking responsibility for forward-looking statements from the 
Australian business community.17 In this article, we canvass why directors are particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.afr.com/p/national/professional_services/confusion_just_one_of_the_hurdles_dzrTmyFIizut3mY2kJ
EYAO viewed 9 October 2014.  
11 Drummond, n 7.  
12 AICD, n 6. 
13 IIRC, n 1 at [3.3]. 
14 IIRC, n 1. 
15 See further, Legg M and Mirzabegian S, “Shareholder Claims in Australia” in Charman A and Du Toit J 
(eds), Shareholder Actions (Bloomsbury Professional, 2013) Ch 14. 
16 King & Wood Mallesons, “The Review (Class Actions in Australia 2013/2014)” 
http://www.mallesons.com/Documents/The%20Review%20Class%20Actions%20in%20Australia%202013%20
2014%20%28Jul14%29_FINAL.pdf viewed 9 October 2014. 
17 See, eg, Stanhope S, “Integrated Reporting is Inevitable and will be Global”, Australian Financial Review (29 
May 2013) 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/professional_services/integrated_reporting_is_inevitable_V4SWCMBLCJhnaJA
MyP7JKL viewed 9 October 2014; Drummond, n 7. 
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concerned about signing off on integrated reports in Australia, and evaluate possible solutions 
that may effectively ameliorate these concerns.  
 
The issue of whether those charged with governance (TCWG) should acknowledge their 
responsibility for the integrated report was one of the most contentious issues in the 
stakeholder responses to the Consultation Draft on the development of the <IR> Framework 
in 2013. Respondents were approximately evenly split on this issue with proponents 
reasoning that such sign off would enhance the responsibility of TCWG for the integrated 
report, and promote the reliability, credibility and accountability of the report. By contrast, 
opponents of requiring a statement from TCWG argued that no statement was necessary as 
such responsibility was already implicit in other parts of the Framework, and would generate 
legal and liability impediments to the uptake of <IR> in some jurisdictions.18 On balance, the 
IIRC decided that without a statement by TCWG, integrated reports may come to be 
perceived as ‘marketing documents’, which was more of a concern than slower take-up of 
<IR> in some jurisdictions.19 Responses to the <IR> Consultation Draft, and reactions to the 
approval of the Framework and subsequently to the Framework’s release, indicate that 
Australia is a major jurisdiction where the requirement for the sign off of TCWG is seen as 
hindering the uptake of <IR>.  
 
Directors’ hesitancy in Australia about signing off on integrated reports appear to be 
interlinked with concerns about their potential personal liability for forward-looking 
statements in Operating and Financial Reviews (OFRs). The focus of this article is on 
forward-looking information disclosures to existing shareholders in Australia, such as those 
                                                            
18 International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), “Basis for Conclusions” http://www.theiirc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-Basis-for-conclusions-IR.pdf  viewed 9 October 2014. 
19 IIRC, n 14.  
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contained in OFRs and integrated reports. Regulatory requirements for forward-looking 
information to attract future shareholders, such as those that related to prospectuses,20 raise 
different legal issues, and will not be a focus of the present discussion.  
 
Although compliance with the <IR> Framework is voluntary in Australia, OFRs are 
mandated by corporations law. Under s 299A(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), annual OFRs 
require an assessment of an entity’s financial performance, position, strategies and future 
prospects. The OFR requirements have received increasing attention from  the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) since 2010, when the Corporations 
Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 2010 (Cth) extended s 299A to apply to all 
listed entities. In practice, however, there was considerable diversity in how these 
requirements were implemented. In March 2013, ASIC released a regulatory guide on 
enhancing companies’ consistent conformity with the OFR requirements under s 299A(1).21 
In this guide, ASIC made it clear that entities should provide the relevant OFR disclosures in 
a ‘single, self-contained section’ of the annual report,22 and clarified the circumstances in 
which the ‘unreasonable prejudice’ exemption could be relied upon.23 For many companies, 
compliance with this non-binding guidance, which is desirable to prevent ASIC taking action 
for non-compliance, necessitated significant changes to their OFR practice.24 Significantly, 
the regulatory expectation of increased OFR disclosures in the Directors’ Report, with sign 
                                                            
20 See, eg, the requirements in s 710(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) regarding forward-looking statements in 
prospectuses.  
21 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), “Regulatory Guide 247: Effective Disclosure in 
an Operating and Financial Review” (March 2013) at [247.81] 
https://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg247-published-27-March-2013.pdf/$file/rg247-
published-27-March-2013.pdf viewed 9 October 2014.  
22 ASIC, n 17 at [247.81]. 
23 ASIC, n 17 at [247.52], [247.65-.78]. 
24 KPMG, n 1.  
7 
 
off by directors, has led to directors’ heightened concerns that they may be personally liable 
for forward-looking statements if those insights subsequently turn out to be incorrect.25  
 
The focus of this article is on the directors’ legal liability concerns hindering the uptake of 
<IR> in Australia, and the possible reforms that may ameliorate these concerns. In order to 
illuminate these issues, the article will canvass the possible grounds for directors’ liability for 
forward-looking statements in OFRs under Australian corporations law as these appear to be 
the types of liability concerns posing an obstacle to the uptake of <IR>. Although there are 
differences between the aims and specifications of OFRs and <IR>, ASIC’s recent regulatory 
guidance around providing clearer explanations of companies’ performance and future 
prospects has been heralded as a ‘stepping stone’ between what is currently being reported in 
OFRs and the requirements of Integrated Reporting.26  
 
Concomitantly, there is concern among some members of the business community that 
additional moves to regulate <IR> may increase companies’ reporting burden, and further 
extend the range of disclosures for which directors’ are potentially liable.27 Directors are 
concerned that, regardless of whether <IR> is adopted as a voluntary or mandatory measure, 
it does raise potential liability concerns for directors under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) if 
a company releases statements that are subsequently found  to be misleading and deceptive, 
or otherwise in breach of the directors’ duties.28 Some observers have claimed that these 
concerns about <IR> may be overblown.29 One such observer is Professor Mervyn King, the 
Chairman of the IIRC, and a pivotal figure in the adoption of <IR> in South Africa, who has 
                                                            
25 Stanhope, n 13. 
26 Drummond, n 7.  
27 Drummond and King, n 7. 
28 See discussion of relevant sections of the Act in Part IV below.  
29 Drummond and King, n 7.  
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questioned whether Australian directors’ resistance to <IR> is motivated by risk-aversion out 
of self-interest, which is an improper motive.30 According to King, the solution to the risk 
that statements may turn out to be misleading is for directors to inform the market if 
circumstances change.31  
 
This article will outline the types of personal liability that directors may attract for erroneous 
forward-looking statements under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Act’) as context for 
the liability concerns in relation to <IR>. Specifically, if forward-looking statements included 
in OFRs and integrated reports are deemed to be ‘misleading and deceptive’, the company 
will be in breach of s 1041H of the Act, potentially exposing directors to personal liability 
under s 79 if they were ‘involved in’ the contravention. Further, following the personal 
liability trend in recent high profile cases such as Centro32 and James Hardie,33 the same 
conduct giving rise to breach of directors duties in these cases (breach of mandatory 
disclosure rules) could potentially be the basis for an alleged contravention of the duty of care 
and diligence in ss 180(1) and 601FD(3) of the Act .  
 
The business judgment rule in s 180(2) of the Act, which provides a defence for breaches of s 
180(1) in specified circumstances, does not currently provide a defence for directors in 
relation to forward-looking statements in companies’ mandatory disclosures, even if they 
made best endeavours in relation to those statements. The legislative shortcomings in the 
operation of the statutory business judgment rule are discussed below. A number of 
prominent representatives of the Australian business community have recognised this and are 
advocating for law reform to provide safe harbours for directors providing forward-looking 
                                                            
30 Drummond, n 7.  
31 Drummond, n 7.  
32 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291 (Centro). 
33 Gillfillan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 92 ACSR 460 (James Hardie). 
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information.34 In this context, the article addresses gaps in the current law under the Act and 
canvasses a range of law reform options for a more effective safe harbour for directors aimed 
at ameliorating liability concerns with regard to forward-looking statements in <IR>.   
 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. In Part II, an overview of <IR> and issues 
inhibiting its uptake in Australia is provided. Part III further explores the linkages between 
<IR> and OFRs, and provides more detail on the OFR requirements in the Corporations Act. 
In Part IV, the types of liability that directors may potentially attract under this legislation are 
canvassed. Part V then outlines the safe harbour provisions for directors’ forward-looking 
statements in comparable jurisdictions such as the US and the UK, before four options for 
reform are considered in Part VI. Part VI considers the desirability of assuring OFRs and 
Integrated Reports, before concluding remarks are offered in Part VII.  
 
Part II: Integrated Reporting and its Potential Uptake in Australia 
The <IR> Framework is principles-based, and provides guidance on key Fundamental 
Concepts, Guiding Principles and Content Elements that need to be considered in preparing 
an integrated report. In order to classify as an integrated report, a report should be prepared in 
accordance with the <IR> Framework,35 and be a ‘designated, identifiable communication’.36  
 
An integrated report can take many forms, one of which is building off existing mandated 
communications such as management commentary,37 the Australian equivalent of which is 
the OFR requirements. As long as a report prepared to meet existing compliance 
requirements is also prepared in accordance with the <IR> Framework, it can still be 
                                                            
34 See, eg, the discussion in Part VI.D. 
35 IIRC, n 1 at [1.2]. 
36 IIRC, n 1 at [1.12]. 
37 IIRC, n 1 at [1.14].  
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considered an integrated report.38 As discussed further in the following section, <IR> can 
thus potentially be seen as an enhanced form of OFR reporting, which underpins directors’ 
concerns that their potential liability for erroneous statements in OFRs may extend to 
additional <IR> disclosures. An integrated report can also be prepared as a standalone report, 
or as a distinguishable part of another report, such as an annual report.39 In order to claim 
they have produced an integrated report, an organisation must apply all the requirements 
identified in bold type in the <IR> Framework unless explanation is provided regarding the 
unavailability of reliable information or specific legal prohibitions.40  
 
There are a number of benefits associated with both the process of <IR> and the final 
product, which is the integrated report. In terms of the process of <IR>, an important 
outcome is ‘integrated thinking’, which is ‘the active consideration by a company of the 
relationships between its various operating and functional units and the capitals that the 
organization uses and affects’.41 Companies gain internal advantages from undertaking 
integrated thinking. Firstly, it advances the alignment of strategic focus with both financial 
and non-financial performance. For many companies it is the first time that senior 
management has considered elements of sustainability performance, and even for many 
companies with a history of publishing sustainability reports, the processes for considering, 
evaluating and communicating financial and sustainability performance has been, and 
continues to be, siloed. The poor state of integration is illustrated by the finding by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre Institute42 that while 499 of the companies in the 
                                                            
38 IIRC, n 1 at [1.14]. 
39 IIRC, n 1 at [1.15].  
40 IIRC, n 1 at [1.17] and [1.18]. 
41 IIRC, n 1 at  9. 
42 Investor Responsibility Research Centre Institute (IRRCI), “Integrated Financial and 
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United States S&P 500 made at least one sustainability related disclosure, only seven 
integrated their financial and sustainability reporting. By taking a holistic view of these two 
interrelated dimensions in commercial, social and environmental contexts, it is argued that 
corporations have an ability to attain a more complete understanding of value drivers and 
how these drivers contribute to their strategic goals. As a result, there are more opportunities 
to enhance the value of a company without compromising its short or long term focus.  
 
Further, with greater comprehension of how a company creates value and the social and 
environmental impact that its activities have, it is more likely that management will recognize 
the imperative of integrating sustainability opportunities and concerns into business 
strategies. Moreover, these strategies can be communicated to the employees to raise 
awareness at the operational level, which will likely facilitate a higher degree of collaboration 
and engagement.43 Another potential advantage stems from the redesign of procedures for 
collecting and gathering data. As the relevant information processes are revamped to capture 
information on each of the capitals, their efficiency and effectiveness will also improve 
significantly which eventually leads to higher quality, more comprehensive and timely 
information.44 This advantage brings about further benefits in the decision-making process 
and the assessment of risks and opportunities. Due to the enhanced quality of information, 
companies have better input on which to base their decisions. These internal benefits of 
<IR>, including the realization of significant cost savings from issues ranging from systems 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Sustainability Reporting in the United States” (2013) 
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf viewed 9 October 
2014.  
43 Adams, Fries and Simnett, n 4.  
44 Eccles, Cheng and Saltzman, n 4.  
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design to energy costs savings, are commonly described in the experiences of the more than 
100 international reporting entities that are currently trialling the principles of <IR>.45  
 
In addition to these internal benefits, the external benefits claimed to be associated with <IR> 
are manifold, as corporations are enabled to demonstrate how they create value, consider 
sustainability matters and coordinate their financial and non-financial efficacy in short, 
medium and long-term perspectives. For example, a discussion paper released by the 
Integrated Reporting Council of South Africa46 suggests that benefits accrue to companies 
that release <IR> information to external stakeholders as “the leadership’s ability to 
demonstrate its effectiveness, coupled with the increase in transparency, could result in a 
lower cost of capital to the organization”.47 Consistent with Dhaliwal et al.’s finding of cost 
of capital benefits for companies disclosing sustainability reports, the value-relevant 
information provided through <IR> can also reasonably be expected to realize cost of capital 
reductions for integrated report preparers.48 Recent research by Zhou shows that the 
improvement in the disclosure quality of integrated reports does lead to a reduction in the 
cost of equity capital, especially for companies with a low analyst following.49 
 
Although providers of financial capital are identified as the primary users of an integrated 
report, <IR> also provides an opportunity for companies to satisfy information demands from 
other key stakeholders and demonstrate willingness to attend to their needs.50 This point leads 
                                                            
45 International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) “Pilot Programme Business Network” (2014) 
http://www.theiirc.org/companies-and-investors/pilot-programme-business-network/ viewed 9 October 2014. 
46 IRCSA, n 4. 
47 IRCSA, n 4. 
48 Dhaliwal et al, n 4.  
49 Zhou, n 4.  
50 Holder-Webb L, Cohen J, Nath L, and Wood D, “The Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
among U.S. Firms” (2009) Journal of Business Ethics (February) 497; Eccles, Cheng and Saltzman, n 4; Eccles 
R and Krzus M, “One Report: Integrated Reporting for a Sustainable Strategy” (John Wiley & Sons, United 
States of America, 2010); IIRC, n 1at 8. 
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to a further benefit resulting from lowering reputation risk. As a member of the wider system, 
it is important that corporations are well-regarded and supported by other parties and the 
general community. Reputation risk management is therefore crucial,51 and the integrated 
report gives rise to a greater extent of transparency regarding a company’s impact on, and 
commitment to, the social, ecological and governance environments. In effect, it becomes an 
effective tool in shaping the public perception that a company is seriously attempting to 
account for their sustainability matters and commit to the delivery of positive impacts for 
society.  
 
Part II.A: Aspects of the <IR> Framework that are Contributing Factors to Directors’ 
Liability Concerns 
Despite the myriad of internal and external benefits that <IR> can provide, there is evidence 
of resistance to integrated reporting in the Australian business community. In the remainder 
of this section, we outline the key provisions of the <IR> Framework that are most likely to 
be contributing to directors’ concerns about liability risks.  
 
One of the requirements identified in bold type in the <IR> Framework is that TCWG will 
include a statement that they are responsible for an integrated report. In the transition period 
of the first three years of a company issuing an integrated report, this can be done on a 
comply-or-explain basis.52 Thus, there is an expectation that TCWG will ultimately take full 
responsibility for the disclosures in a company’s integrated report. This perhaps partly 
explains the reticence of Australian companies to engage with the <IR> Framework. In 2013, 
only six Australian companies listed on the Global Reporting Initiative web site self-claimed 
                                                            
51 Eccles, R G, Jr., Newquist S C, and Schatz R, “Reputation and its Risks” (2007) 85(2) Harvard Business 
Review 104. 
52 IIRC, n 1 at [1.20]. 
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that they had provided an ‘integrated’ report. Table 1 provides a summary of the features of 
these ‘integrated’ reports. As indicated in Table 1, TCWG assumed responsibility for all six 
reports, suggesting that these directors were not unduly concerned with potential liability 
risks related to forward looking comments, perhaps reflective that this concern does not hold 
over all of TCWG, or that the reporting of forward looking information in these particular 
instances was of a form that did not raise personal liability risks. Only two of the six 
companies mentioned the <IR> Framework, which was at that time in draft form, and in both 
cases these companies were pilots aligned with the IIRC.53 As the <IR> Framework was 
released at the end of 2013, it will be interesting to see whether more Australian companies 
explicitly link their ‘integrated’ reports with the <IR> Framework. One reason they may not 
is that, if they do so, they only have three years before TCWG are required to take 
responsibility for these reports. As discussed in Part IV, there are potential legal liability risks 
that may attach to this responsibility.   
 
One area that directors are particularly reluctant to accept personal liability is in relation to 
forward-looking statements which, by their very nature, are subject to change as future events 
unfold in ways that were previously unexpected. Forward-looking statements can include 
revenue, income and other financial and economic performance projections, as well as 
management’s strategies and targets for future operations. In relation to forward-looking 
information in <IR>, guiding principle 3A specifically pertains to ‘Strategic focus and future 
orientation’. This guiding principle states that ‘An integrated report should provide insight 
into the organization’s strategy, and how it relates to the organization’s ability to create value 
in the short, medium and long term, and to its use of and effects on the capitals’.54 Future 
                                                            
53 These companies are Stockland Corporation Ltd and National Australia Bank. 
54 IIRC, n 1 at [3.3]. 
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information is also relevant to Content Element 4E: Strategy and Resource Allocation, which 
states that ‘An integrated report should answer the question: Where does the organization 
want to go and how does it intend to get there?’55 and Content Element 4G: Outlook, which 
asks companies to report as to ‘What challenges and uncertainties is the organization likely to 
encounter in pursuing its strategy, and what are the potential implications for its business 
model and future performance?’56 In addition, future-oriented information is addressed under 
Guiding Principle 3F: Reliability and Completeness, with paragraph 3.53 specifying that 
‘Future-oriented information is by nature more uncertain than historical information. 
Uncertainty is not, however, a reason in itself to exclude such information’.  
 
Although these types of information are highly valued by shareholders and stakeholders, 
issues of director liability for forward-looking commentary underpin many directors’ caution 
about <IR>. Former president of the Business Council of Australia, Graham Bradley, 
FAICD, summarises directors’ concerns: 
 
[T]he push for more “future-oriented information” will be of particular concern for 
boards given the self-evident liability risks of forecasting in a volatile global business 
environment. This risk is that lengthy cautionary statements and extensive listing of key 
assumptions will erode the informational value of mandating more detailed future 
outlook statements.57  
 
In addition, some directors are concerned that extended disclosures of companies’ strategies, 
business models, and other non-mandatory information may jeopardise the competitive 
advantage of firms. Paragraph 3.51 of the Framework recommends a balancing process that 
weighs the risks of disclosing information about the ‘essence’ of a strategy that may indicate 
a competitive advantage against the need for the integrated report to achieve its primary 
                                                            
55 IIRC, n 1 at [4.27]. 
56 IIRC, n 1 at [4.34]. 
57 AICD, n 6.  
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purpose of explaining to providers of financial capital how an organisation creates value over 
time.58 This has clear parallels with the OFR requirement in s 299A(1) Corporations Act in 
which the annual directors’ report must contain information about an entity’s business 
strategies and prospects for future financial years unless to do so may result in unreasonable 
prejudice.  
 
Part III: <IR>, OFRs and Forward-Looking Statements 
The OFR disclosures required in ASIC’s 2013 Regulatory Guide, RG 247, can be seen as a 
step towards <IR>.59 Moreover, RG 247 disclosures may be further enhanced by using the 
<IR> Framework.60 In relation to the latter point, KPMG argue that the <IR> Framework 
may be particularly useful in helping companies to provide ‘a clear explanation of the 
organisation’s business model, its business strategies, and its prospects’,61 as required under s 
299A Corporations Act. That is, <IR> is not fundamentally different from what is already 
required under Australian law,62 and may well serve as a means of enhancing OFR reporting. 
Although <IR> is not currently mandated in Australia, if companies meet their OFR 
requirements through adopting <IR>, directors’ potential liability for misleading and 
deceptive disclosures in OFRs may thus also apply to these integrated reports. These 
similarities between <IR> and OFRs, and the potential for both the OFR and <IR> 
requirements to be met simultaneously in the one document, or any other way in which <IR> 
requirements may become mandatory disclosure requirements in Australia, may underpin 
some of the concerns in the Australian business community about directors’ liability for 
erroneous forward-looking statements in both contexts.  
                                                            
58 IIRC, n 1 at [3.51], [1.17].  
59 Drummond and King, n 7. 
60 KPMG, n 1. 
61 KPMG, n 1 at 43. 
62 Drummond S, “Integrating Reporting Defended” (2013) Australian Financial Review, 30 May, p 14. 
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The purpose of the OFR provisions in the Corporations Act is to ‘help ensure that the 
financial report and directors’ report are presented in a manner that maximises their 
usefulness, with a particular focus on the needs of people who are unaccustomed to reading 
financial reports’.63 The putative benefits of OFR reporting include providing a central 
repository of relevant information, promoting consistency of disclosure between larger and 
smaller listed entities,64 and clarifying the underlying drivers and reasons for an entity’s 
performance.65 These are also aims of <IR>, which is why some commentators have argued 
that the OFR provisions and related regulatory guidance may provide a suitable platform for 
the adoption of <IR> in Australia.66 In determining what is reasonably required to be reported 
in an OFR, the company’s specific circumstances, including, inter alia, its size, maturity, 
industry and complexity should all be taken into account.67 
 
Since 2010, compliance with OFR requirements has been one of ASIC’s surveillance focal 
points, and continues to be an area of focus for the regulator in 2014.68 One of the reasons 
behind the release of RG 247 was a gap between the aims of the OFR requirements and 
practice. For example, potential impediments to OFRs include lengthy, ‘boiler-plate’ 
disclosures that hinder rather than promote effective communication, and companies simply 
reproducing content from financial statements, rather than providing narratives that are easier 
for non-expert investors to comprehend.69 As foreshadowed in the Introduction, the guidance 
in RG 247 specified that entities should provide the relevant OFR disclosures in a ‘single, 
                                                            
63 ASIC, n 17 at [247.25]. 
64 ASIC, n 17 at [247.8]. 
65 ASIC, n 17 at [247.43]. 
66 KPMG, n 1.  
67 ASIC, n 17 at [247.32].  
68 KPMG, n 1. 
69 KPMG, n 1. 
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self-contained section’ of the annual report.70 This is similar to the requirement in paragraph 
1.12 of the <IR> Framework that ‘An integrated report should be a designated, identifiable 
communication’. Although the guidance in RG 247 is non-binding, many companies perceive 
that compliance is desirable to prevent ASIC taking action for non-compliance. Thus, there is 
a regulatory expectation of increased OFR disclosures in the annual report, with sign off by 
directors, underpinning directors’ concerns about potential personal liability if forward-
looking statements subsequently prove to be unfounded.71  
 
Forward-looking information has particular salience in the OFR requirements under s 
299A(1) Corporations Act.72 This section specifies that the annual directors’ report must 
contain information that members of the entity would reasonably require to make an 
informed assessment of the entity’s operations, financial position, and ‘business strategies, 
and prospects for future financial years’. However, there is provision in s 299A(3) to omit 
information that would otherwise be included under paragraph (1)(c) regarding business 
strategies and prospects for future financial years if it may result in unreasonable prejudice, 
so long as the report acknowledges the omitted information, and that information is not 
otherwise publicly available.73 Regulatory Guide 247 specifies that this discussion will 
typically be in the form of a ‘narrative explaining the financial performance and financial 
outcomes the entity expects to achieve overall’.74 Significantly, the Guide states that, ‘It is 
important that a discussion about future prospects is balanced. It is likely to be misleading to 
discuss prospects for future financial years without referring to the material business risks 
                                                            
70 ASIC, n 17 at [247.81]. 
71 Drummond, n 56 at p 14.  
72 Related requirements can be found under s 299(1)(e) Corporations Act,  it is specified that annual directors’ 
reports must include, inter alia, ‘likely developments in the entity’s operations in future financial years and the 
expected results of those operations’ (emphasis added).   
73 ASIC, n 17 at [247.52]. 
74 ASIC, n 17 at [247.60]. 
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that could adversely affect the achievement of the financial prospects described for those 
years’.75 The focus on forward-looking information in both OFRs and integrated reports is a 
key contributing factor to directors’ reticence to sign off on both types of disclosures without 
more substantial legal safeguards.  
 
Part IV: Directors’ and Other Officers’ Liability for Forward-Looking Information  
There are a number of potential grounds of liability for directors and other officers76 under 
the Corporations Act for forward-looking statements in OFRs, and integrated reports that are 
serving a dual function as an OFR. These include the provisions for misleading conduct,77 
and lack of due care and diligence.78 In addition, there is potential liability arising under the 
Competition and Consumer Law 2010 (Cth), the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth), contract law, tort law and criminal law. In line with this paper’s 
focus on <IR> and OFRs, the focus of the following discussion will be on potential grounds 
for liability under the Corporations Act.  
 
Part IV.A: Misleading and Deceptive Conduct 
Under s 1041H Corporations Act, ‘conduct, in relation to a financial product or a financial 
service, that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive’ is proscribed. This 
provision covers both misstatements and non-disclosures,79 and may extend to ‘innocent’ 
                                                            
75 ASIC, n 17 at [247.61]. 
76 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9. 
77 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 769C and 1041H. 
78 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 180(1) and 601FD(3). 
79 Baxt R, Black A and Hanrahan P, Securities and Financial Services Law (8th ed, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2012). 
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disclosure failures.80 Although failure to comply with s 1041H is not an offence, it may 
nonetheless give rise to civil liability for loss or damage under s 1041I.81 
 
Section 1041H applies to conduct in relation to a financial product or financial service, which 
potentially includes conduct in relation to securities.82 The court observed that the phrase ‘in 
relation to’ ‘ought to receive a broad construction’.83 It is arguable, therefore, that forward-
looking statements in OFRs and integrated reports that have a material effect on the price or 
value of shares, for example, may constitute conduct in relation to a financial product.  In 
order for conduct to be ‘misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive’, it must ‘lead 
or be likely to lead’ a reasonable person or class of persons ‘into error’.84  
 
For the purposes of Chapter 7, which includes s 1041H, s 769C Corporations Act specifies 
that if a person (in this case, the reporting entity85) does not have ‘reasonable grounds’ for 
making a representation about future matters,86 which includes the doing of, or failing to do, 
                                                            
80 Bednall T and Hanrahan P, “Officers’ Liability for Mandatory Corporate Disclosure: Two Paths, Two 
Destinations?” (2013) 31 C&SLJ 474 at 484. 
81 Similar provisions are contained in s 18 ACL and s 12DA Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (Cth). As Baxt, Black and Hanrahan note, in practice, proceedings are typically commenced under 
multiple provisions: Baxt, Black and Hanrahan, n 73 at 283. 
82 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Pt 7.1 Div 3 and ss 764A(1) and 761A. 
83 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Narain (2008) 169 FCR 211, per Finkelstein J at [9]. 
84 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking v BMW Australia Finance (2010) 241 CLR 357 at [15] per French CJ 
and Kiefel J. There are additional provisions in the Corporations Act that cover intentionally or recklessly 
including false or misleading information in public documents such as OFRs. An entity that makes or authorises 
the making of a statement that the entity knows is ‘false or misleading in a material particular, or omits or 
authorises the omission of any matter or thing without which the document is to the person’s knowledge 
misleading in a material respect, is guilty of an offence’ under s 1308(2). Moreover, if an entity makes such a 
statement or omission ‘without having taken reasonable steps to ensure that the statement was not false or 
misleading or to ensure that the statement did not omit any matter or thing without which the document would 
be misleading’, it contravenes s 1308(4), and is guilty of an offence. These provisions apply to misleading 
information that is intentionally or recklessly included in an OFR (RG247.34) if the failure to take steps reflects 
criminal, rather than civil, negligence: Gould v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (2009) 
71 ACSR 648; [2009] FCA 475 at [233]. However, these will not be a focus here as the debate about proposed 
reforms is premised on innocent, rather than knowingly fraudulent, misstatements. 
85 Or, as is established below, a director or other officer who is ‘involved in the contravention’ under s 79 
Corporations Act. 
86 Cf other representations under s1041H, for which a statement may be held to be misleading even if there is an 
absence of intention on the part of the person who made the statement to mislead or deceive: Australian 
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an act, it is ‘taken to be misleading’. It appears that the burden of proving lack of reasonable 
grounds for a representation about future matters lies with the person alleging the 
misrepresentation.87 Thus, if a reasonable person making a decision about, for example, 
investing in securities is lead into error by a representation about future matters in an OFR or 
integrated report that they can prove lacked reasonable grounds, s 1041H will be 
contravened, triggering civil liability for any resulting loss or damage under s 1041I. 
 
For the OFR requirements under the Corporations Act, the disclosure obligation is on the 
listed entity itself. However, the entity’s directors and offices may be personally liable in 
some circumstances as a result of being ‘involved’ in the entity’s contravention,88 or through 
the attribution of negligence,89 which is discussed below. Relevantly here, liability may 
extend to directors and other officers if they are a person ‘involved in a contravention’ of s 
1041H via s 79 of the Corporations Act.90 To establish such liability in respect of 
representations about future matters, Bednall and Hanrahan argue that a plaintiff must show 
that the person allegedly involved in the contravention had ‘actual knowledge that the 
representation was made, and that it was misleading or that the corporation had no reasonable 
grounds for making it’.91 As the director should sign off on the OFR or integrated report, 
proving actual knowledge of the representation should be straightforward. However, Bednall 
and Hanrahan argue that proving that the director had actual knowledge that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Securities and Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 81 ACSR 563; [2011] FCAFC 19 
at [102]. 
87 Clifford v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 135 at [148]. 
88 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 79. 
89 Bednall and Hanrahan, n 74.  
90 This section states that ‘a person  is involved in a contravention if, and only if, the person:  
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or  
(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; or  
(c) has been in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the 
contravention; or  
(d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention’. 
91 Quinlivan v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2004) 160 FCR 1 at [15]; Bednall and 
Hanrahan, n 74 at 491 fn 94. 
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representation was misleading or that the corporation had no reasonable grounds for it 
constitutes a potentially high hurdle that will be difficult for a prosecutor or plaintiff to 
establish.92 Perhaps because negligence is easier to establish than actual knowledge, business 
leaders’ concerns about liability for OFRs and <IR> appears to centre on directors’ potential 
liability for lack of due care and diligence under s 180(1) in the absence of adequate safe 
harbour protections.93 
 
Part IV.B: Breach of Care and Diligence 
Directors and other officers may also be liable for forward-looking statements that are in 
breach of the statutory duty of care they owe to the company under s 180(1) Corporations 
Act. Business leaders’ concerns about potential liability for lack of due care and diligence in 
relation to forward-looking statements in integrated reports is highlighted in the following 
excerpt from submission of the Governance Institute of Australia (then Chartered Secretaries 
Australia (CSA)) to the 2013 <IR> consultation process: 
 
Directors are subject to statutory and common law duties which require them to act with 
reasonable care and diligence, in good faith in the best interests of the company and for a 
proper purpose. A defence may apply to decisions taken by directors in relation to breaches of 
care and diligence but it is not available, at least in Australia, where the process leading up to 
the decision is defective (such as where the decision is made on the basis of clearly inadequate 
information or it is not reasonable to rely on the advice of those providing the information). 
Providing forward-looking reporting means that the information provided could well be based 
on inadequate information, given that circumstances can change rapidly. This exposes directors 
to much higher risks of actions against them, including class actions, which are becoming 
increasingly prevalent and remain only lightly regulated.94 
 
In this part, the potential legal bases for directors’ liability on these grounds are outlined. 
 
                                                            
92 Bednall and Hanrahan, n 74 at 494.  
93 Drummond and King, n 7; Drummond, n 56. 
94 CSA, n 6. 
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Under s 180(1) of the Act, a ‘director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their 
powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable 
person would exercise’ in their situation. Section 180(1) is a civil penalty provision under s 
1317E Corporations Act giving rise to disqualification orders from management,95 pecuniary 
penalties96 and compensation orders.97    
 
The decriminalisation of a breach of s 180(1), and the subsequent elevation of the 
performance expectation of the modern director in Daniels v Anderson98 by rejecting the 
subjective test to determine breach, has resulted in vigorous enforcement of this duty by 
ASIC.99 This quantum shift has a significant impact on liability concerns for directors. This is 
exacerbated by the enforcement approach adopted by ASIC based on derivative liability 
where company directors are often made liable for the company’s conduct by default. 
Following the personal liability trend in recent high profile cases such as Centro and James 
Hardie,100 the same conduct that forms the basis for the company’s breach of mandatory 
disclosure rules could potentially be the basis for an alleged contravention by the director of 
ss 180(1) and 601FD(3) of the Act for failure to exercise due care and diligence.  
 
                                                            
95 See, for example, Gillfillan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 92 ACSR 460 where 
the entire board of James Hardie Ltd were disqualified from management for breach of duty of care when 
approving misleading media release to the public. 
96 See, for example, ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 where both Alder and Williams, directors, were ordered 
to pay pecuniary penalties of $400,000 and $245,000 respectively for breach of directors’ duties, including duty 
of care. 
97 See, for example, ASIC v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72 where both Adler and Williams, directors, were ordered 
to pay nearly $8 million compensation to the company for breach of directors’ duties, including duty of care. 
98 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; Cf Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 which accepted a lower 
standard of care and diligence, measured by a subjective standard to determine breach. 
99 For fuller discussion on the evolution of the duty of care and diligence and the modern performance 
expectations of directors, see ASIC v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1;  Baxt R, “The Duty of Care of Directors: Does it 
Depend on the Swing of the Pendulum?” in Ramsay  I (ed), Corporate Governance and Duties of Company 
Directors (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 1997). 
100 For detailed analysis of ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 71 ACSR 368, see Hargovan, A, “Corporate 
Governance Lessons from James Hardie” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 984.  This decision was 
subsequently upheld by the High Court in ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 88 ACSR 246 and in Shafron v ASIC (2012) 
88 ACSR 126. 
24 
 
Herzberg and Anderson have described the above approach as part of the ‘stepping stone’ 
approach, by which ASIC ‘applies directors’ duties in a novel context’.101 They note: 
 
The first stepping stone involves an action against the company for contravention of the 
[Corporations Act]. The establishment of corporate fault then leads to the second 
stepping stone; a finding that by exposing their company to the risk of criminal 
prosecution, civil liability or significant reputational damage, directors contravened 
their statutory duty of care with the attendant civil penalty consequences.102  
 
Thus, for example, if a company contravenes its obligations for OFRs and integrated reports 
under s 299A by including false or misleading forward-looking information, invoking 
liability under s 1041I, a director who caused or allowed the contravention to take place may 
be in breach of their statutory duty of care, with attendant civil pecuniary penalties and 
disqualification risks. In this way, both the company and an individual director may be liable 
for the same conduct.103 
 
Since the introduction of the statutory business judgment rule in 2000 as a safe harbour for 
director liability, Australia is yet to witness successful reliance on this defence.104 The 
practical utility of the statutory business judgment rule has been questioned – both prior to105 
                                                            
101 Herzberg A and Anderson H, “Stepping Stones – From Corporate Fault to Directors’ Personal Civil 
Liability” (2012) Federal Law Review 40, 181. For collection of judicial authorities adopting the stepping stone 
approach to director liability, see Australian Institute of Company Directors - A Proposal for Law Reform: The 
Honest and Reasonable Director Defence (AICD, Sydney, August 2014) at  8. 
102 Herzberg and Anderson, n 95 at 182. 
103 As Bednall and Hanrahan note, ‘it does not flow automatically from a finding that an entity has contravened 
the Corporations Act that the officers must have contravened their duty of care to the company. What matters is 
whether, in a particular instance, each officer has taken reasonable care to protect against a foreseeable risk of 
harm to the company resulting from their own action (or inaction). … [W]hat can reasonably be expected of a 
director or other officer in a particular case depends upon the corporation’s circumstances and the particular 
office held by, and responsibilities of, the individual officer’: n 74 at 496. 
104 For a critical assessment of the business judgment rule, see ASIC v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1;  Lumsden A, 
“The Business Judgment Defence: Insights from ASIC v Rich” (2010) 28 C&SLJ 164. 
105 Redmond  P, ‘Safe Harbours or Sleepy Hollows: Does Australia Need a Statutory Business Judgment Rule?’ 
in I Ramsay (ed), Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors (Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 1997). 
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and after its introduction106 – with one senior legal commentator dismissing it as mere 
window dressing.107 
 
Significantly, protection from liability from the business judgment rule in s 180(2) of the 
Corporations Act108 does not apply to forward-looking information as a decision as to what 
should be disclosed is not considered a business judgment. This is because a ‘decision related 
to compliance with the requirements of the Act’, such as fulfilling reporting requirements 
under s 299A, does not relate to the ‘business operations’ of the entity, and is thus not a 
business judgment as defined under s 180(3).109 Thus, if a director or officer is found liable 
for breaching the statutory duty of care in relation to a misleading forward-looking statement 
in an OFR or integrated report, no protection against liability is provided by the business 
judgment rule as currently formulated.  
 
Although directors are allowed to delegate powers110 and to rely on others,111 there are limits 
to the operation of these defences as highlighted by the Centro and James Hardie 
                                                            
106  Young N, “Has Directors’ Liability Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough? A Review of the Standard of Conduct 
Required of Directors under Sections 180-184 of the Corporations Act” (2008) 26 C&SLJ 216. Cf judgment of 
Austin J in ASIC v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 where his Honour found that s 180(2) had some protective work to 
do.  
107 Young, n 100.  
108 The business judgment rule in s 180(2) states that: ‘A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a 
business judgment is taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1), and their equivalent duties at common 
law and in equity, in respect of the judgment if they:  
(a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; and  
(b) do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; and  
(c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be 
appropriate; and  
(d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.  
The director’s or officer’s belief that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation is a rational one 
unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in their position would hold.’ 
109 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 364 per 
Keane CJ. 
110 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 198D. 
111 Corporations Act 2011 (Cth), s 189. 
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decisions.112  In Centro, it was held that signing off on the company’s accounts was a board 
function that was not delegable to management and remained the responsibility of the board 
itself. In James Hardie, it was held that the board’s reliance on experts was unreasonable in 
the circumstances of the case. Directors seeking judicial relief for breach of duties under ss 
1317S or 1318 of the Corporations Act have not fared very well despite frequent attempts to 
rely on these provisions for forgiveness. To date, the courts have been overwhelmingly 
reluctant to excuse honest but negligent conduct by directors, as illustrated by the Centro and 
James Hardie decisions.113 
 
Part V: Safe Harbours for Forward-Looking Information in the US and UK 
The current legal position in Australia in relation to directors’ potential liability for forward-
looking information, such as information required in integrated reports and OFRs, is out of 
step with the legal position in comparable jurisdictions such as the US and the UK.  In the 
US, voluntary public disclosure of corporate projections and predictions and other forward-
looking statements114 is ‘now the norm’ as a result of safe harbour provisions under 
                                                            
112 For fuller discussion on the operation of these defences, see Byrne M, “Do Directors Need Better Statutory 
Protection When Acting on the Advice of Others?” (2008) 21 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 238. 
113 Rare exceptions have arisen in the context of director liability for insolvent trading under s 588G of the 
Corporations Act. A director obtained partial relief from liability in Hall v Poolman (2007) 65 ACSR 123 and 
full relief from liability in Re McLellan; Stake Man Pty Ltd v Carroll (2009) 76 ACSR 67; see further, 
Hargovan A, “Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading, Statutory Forgiveness and Law Reform” (2010) 18 
Insolvency Law Journal 96. 
114 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (US) identifies a forward-looking statement as any of 
the following: 
(A) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including some loss), earnings (including 
earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial terms; 
(B) A statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations, including plans or 
objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer; 
(C) A statement of future economic performance, including any such statement contained in a discussion 
and analysis of financial condition by the management or in in the results of operations included 
pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
(D) Any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in subparagraph 
(A), (B), or (C ); 
(E) Any report issued by an outsider reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that the report assesses a 
forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or 
(F) A statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be specified by rule or 
regulation of the Commission. 
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legislative law reform.115  In 1995 Congress enacted reforms that enable companies to make 
forward-looking statements without the risk of liability so long as they include meaningful 
cautionary warnings outlining the risks that could eventuate if the actual results differ from 
the predictions made.116 The safe harbor was enacted as amendments that added a new 
section 27A to the Securities Act of 1933 and a new section 21E to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 to achieve dual aims: (a) to protect against meritless private securities litigation 
arising from strike suits; and (b) to increase the flow of useful information into the capital 
markets.117  
 
The relevant provisions, cast very widely to insulate the issuer of forward -looking 
statements, are summarised by Ripken:  
 
The Safe Harbor contains three alternative provisions that immunize defendants from 
liability for making forward-looking statements that turn out to be untrue. First, a 
defendant will not be liable for any forward-looking statement that is “identified as a 
forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements 
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from 
those in the forward-looking statement” (the “meaningful cautionary statement 
prong”). Second, no liability attaches to forward-looking statements that are 
“immaterial” (the “immateriality prong”). Third, the defendant is not liable if the 
plaintiff fails to prove that the forward looking statement “was made with actual 
knowledge ... that the statement was false or misleading” (the “actual knowledge 
prong”).118 
 
Thus, the company has a statutory safe harbour protection against potential liability for 
making forward-looking statements through three separate tests.119  Appropriately, however, 
the threat of enforcement action by the SEC remains as a deterrent against any attempt by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
The term “person acting on behalf of an issuer” means any officer, director, or employee of such issuer. 
115 Olazabal A M, “False Forward-Looking Statements and the PSLRA’s Safe Harbour” (2011) 86 Indiana Law 
Journal 595 at 595.   
116 Ripken SK, “Predictions, Protections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate 
Forward-Looking Statements” (2005) No. 4 University of Illinois Law Review 929 at 929. 
117 For discussion of legislative history, policy considerations and judicial application, see Olazabal, n 108. 
118 Ripken, n 110 at 948 (citations omitted). 
119 For critical analysis, see Slayton v Am.Express.Co., 604 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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issuer to defraud the market.  This measure is viewed as sufficient disincentive for abuse of 
the safe harbour as a licence by any issuer to deliberately lie to the market. 
 
The Companies Act 2006 (UK) provides a similar provision to the third prong of the US’s 
safe harbor provision in relation to the directors’ report, strategic report, and directors’ 
remuneration report. Under s 463(3), a director is only liable to compensate the company for 
any loss suffered as a result of an untrue or misleading statement, or an omission of a 
mandated disclosure, if the director ‘knew or was reckless as to whether the statement was 
untrue or misleading; or knew the omission to be dishonest concealment of a material fact’. 
Directors are not liable to a person other than the company resulting from the reliance on 
information in such a report.120 This protection extends to future-oriented information in the 
strategic report. The strategic report provisions, which came into force in September 2013, 
place a requirement on companies to, inter alia, ‘discuss the main trends and factors likely to 
affect the future development, performance and position of the company’s business’ ‘to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the business’.121 There are thus clear overlaps 
between the aims of strategic reports in the UK, OFRs in Australia, and <IR>. In the UK, 
section 463 of the Act gives comfort to directors that, except in cases of dishonesty or 
recklessness, they cannot be sued for negligence by making forward-looking statements in 
strategic reports.   
 
As discussed in the previous section, Australia does not have a comparable safe harbour 
protection for directors who make forward-looking statements in reports such as integrated 
                                                            
120 Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 463(4). For critical discussion, see Aiyegbayo O and Villiers C, “The Enhanced 
Business Review: Has it Made Corporate Governance More Effective?” (2011) 7 Journal of Business Law 699; 
Villiers C, “Narrative Reporting and Enlightened Shareholder Value under the Companies Act 2006” in 
Loughrey J (ed), Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crises, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2013 at 97. 
121 Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 414C(7)(a). 
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reports and OFRs. The following passage from the submission of the Governance Institute of 
Australia (then Chartered Secretaries Australia (CSA)) to the 2013 consultation process 
exemplifies the business community’s concerns in this regard: 
At present, an adequate ‘safe harbour’ from liability for directors and executives for making 
forward-looking statements has not been adopted in Australia, although CSA notes it has in 
other jurisdictions such as the UK. CSA and other parties are advocating that such a ‘safe 
harbour’ be introduced in Australia, on the basis that the uptake of integrated reporting and the 
call for increasingly detailed forward-looking statements in ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 247 on 
the operating and financial review (OFR) will be hindered if this liability issue is not 
addressed.122 
 
Against this backdrop, in the following section, four options for reform, each of which 
address directors’ liability concerns about <IR> in less or more far-reaching ways, will be 
canvassed. These options are outlined in ascending order in terms of ease of 
operationalisation. 
 
Part VI: Four Options for Reform 
Part VI.A:  An Exception to the TCWG Responsibility for <IR> Requirement in the 
Australian Context 
One possibility is that the IIRC could be requested to make an exception in Australia to the 
requirement that TCWG take responsibility for integrated reports after three years. The case 
for applying for such an exception has been outlined in this article; namely, that the legal 
context in Australia, which differs from comparable jurisdictions, is inhibiting the uptake of 
<IR> in this country. To date, the IIRC has not outlined a clear process for how it will resolve 
issues such as this. If an application was made to the IIRC regarding this issue, it may 
catalyse the development and clarification of a process for accommodating these types of 
jurisdictional issues.  
 
                                                            
122 CSA, n 6. 
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An alternative approach is for Australian companies to follow, but not refer to, the <IR> 
Framework. As outlined previously, paragraph 1.17 of the Framework specifies that an 
organisation must apply all the requirements identified in bold type in the <IR> Framework, 
including the requirement that TCWG will take responsibility for the integrated report, in 
order to claim they have produced an integrated report. By adopting this option, companies 
can reap the internal and potentially some of the external benefits of <IR>, as outlined above, 
but do not need to comply with the TCWG responsibility requirement of the <IR> 
Framework. This would allay directors’ concerns about personal liability for forward-looking 
statements in integrated reporting, but not in relation to OFRs. 
 
Part VI.B:  Additional Guidance in RG 247 
As outlined above, many directors’ concerns about potential personal liability for <IR> are 
interrelated with their caution around personal liability for OFRs. As the OFR requirements 
in s 299A are reporting obligations, compliance with which is enforced by ASIC as the 
regulator, ASIC could be petitioned to amend its regulatory guidance in RG 247 to reassure 
directors required to make forward-looking statements. Just as RG 247 made explicit the 
requirement that entities should provide the relevant OFR disclosures in a ‘single, self-
contained section’ of the annual report,123 it could be amended124 to mirror the UK position in 
s 463 of the 2006 Act that ASIC will only undertake compliance actions against directors for 
forward-looking statements in OFRs if ASIC can establish the director ‘knew or was reckless 
as to whether the statement was untrue or misleading; or knew the omission to be dishonest 
                                                            
123 ASIC, n 17 at [247.81]. 
124 It is not unprecedented for ASIC’s regulatory guides to be amended. For example, ‘Regulatory Guide 214: 
Guidance on ASIC Market Integrity Rules for ASX and ASX 24 Markets’ was re-issued in 2014 with minor 
amendments to the previous version issued in 2010: Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), 
“Regulatory Guide 214: Guidance on ASIC Market Integrity Rules for ASX and ASX 24 Markets” (February 
2014) http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg214-published-7-February-
2014.pdf/$file/rg214-published-7-February-2014.pdf  viewed 9 October 2014. 
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concealment of a material fact’. In this way, an effective safe harbour could be provided to 
directors by clarifying ASIC’s enforcement policy, rather than through statutory amendment, 
which may be more difficult to achieve in practice. This type of protection could extend to 
integrated reports if companies are producing OFRs that simultaneously fulfil the 
requirements of the <IR> Framework.  
 
Part VI.C: Reform of Section 299A  
A related option, which would necessitate statutory amendment, is for s 299A to be amended 
to provide a safe harbour for directors for forward-looking information. Here, the US safe 
harbour protections provide a possible model. That is, a new sub-section in s 299A could 
specify that directors will be immune from liability for forward-looking statements that turn 
out to be untrue if a ‘meaningful cautionary statement’ is provided, and/or the forward-
looking statements are immaterial, and/or that ASIC as the regulator cannot prove that the 
forward looking statement was made with actual knowledge that the statement was false or 
misleading.125 As this type of safe harbour protection would be enshrined in legislation, it 
would likely offer greater comfort to Australian directors engaging in OFRs and integrated 
reporting. 
 
However, as a statutory amendment along these lines would require an amendment Act for 
the Corporations Act to be passed by both houses of Parliament, a strong case for legislative 
reform would need to be made. In light of the altered environment in which directors in 
Australia now operate, with securities class actions and litigation funding a permanent part of 
the legal landscape, any move to consider such a proposal to stem open-ended liability does 
not appear to be far-fetched or fanciful.  Unlike the Australian position discussed earlier, the 
                                                            
125 Ripken, n 111. 
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US approach strikes a balance – it offers the twin benefits of weeding out meritless claims but 
also allowing meritorious claims to proceed.  Similar to the US position, ASIC can retain the 
residual power to take enforcement action should there be any deliberate attempt to mislead 
the public. In spite of the imperfections in the US model,126 dealing with definitional issues, it 
provides a template on which to build upon. 
 
Part VI.C: A Broad and Overarching Defence 
The final, and most far-reaching, proposed option is to insert a broad and overarching defence 
for directors in the Corporations Act which also modifies the current business judgment rule 
in s 180(2) of the Act. Simply reforming the existing statutory business judgment rule would 
have little effect as s 180(2) is limited in scope - (1) it only applies in respect of a business 
judgment, narrowly defined in s 180(3) which requires an actual decision; and (2) it only 
applies to one aspect of directors’ duties, namely, breach of the duty of care and diligence 
(statutory, common law and in equity).   
 
Unsurprisingly, there have been repeated calls for law reform in this area, with the most 
recent call led by the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) for the introduction 
of an overarching defence in the Corporations Act known as the ‘honest and reasonable 
director defence’.127  This broad based defence is designed to overcome the limits of the 
statutory business judgment rule by applying to all acts and omissions by a director so long as 
the director acted with honesty (without moral turpitude), for a proper purpose and with the 
                                                            
126 See further, Norman J, “PSLRA Safe Harbor: A New Perspective On ‘Important Factors’” (2012) 12 Wake 
Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law 313. 
127 Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD), “A Proposal for Law Reform: The Honest and 
Reasonable Director Defence” (AICD, Sydney, August 2014) 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/Resources/Director%20Resource%20Centre/Policy%20on%20di
rector%20issues/2014/The%20Honest%20%20Reasonable%20Director%20Defence%20A%20Proposal%20for
%20Reform_August%202014_F.ashx viewed 9 October 2014. 
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degree of care and diligence that the director rationally believes to be reasonable in all the 
circumstances.128  If adopted by parliament, this defence will integrate the current objective 
test under s 180(1) duty of care and diligence with a new subjective test which will 
potentially excuse a director from liability from breach of s 180(1) based on the surrounding 
circumstances.  So long as the director’s belief as to the circumstances of the care and 
diligence exercised is rational, a director can be exempt from liability for omissions or 
compliance duties.129 
 
A broader consideration of how the honest and reasonable director defence may apply to 
other liability provisions under the Corporations Act is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, viewed in the specific context of liability for forward-looking statements, the 
adoption of the AICD law reform proposal is likely to provide some comfort to directors. The 
broad nature of the proposed defence, with particular reference to the subjective component, 
may provide immunity for directors for making a forward-looking statement that turns out to 
be untrue.   Based on all the surrounding circumstances of the case, the director may not be 
found liable for conduct later found to be unreasonable so long as he or she acted with 
honesty and genuinely believed that the care exercised was reasonable and that this 
assessment was rationale. The proposed defence, in this manner, retains but dilutes the 
strength of the objective standard which currently underpins ss 180(1) and 180(2) of the Act. 
It also overcomes the current restrictive threshold requirement in s 180(3) to access the 
statutory business judgment rule. The AICD law reform proposal, if accepted by parliament, 
should go a long way to allay the current reticence by directors to adopt Integrated Reporting. 
 
                                                            
128 AICD, n 121. 
129 AICD, n 121. 
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Whilst an amendment to the Corporations Act along these lines may well allay Australian 
directors’ litigation fears, such an amendment will have far-reaching consequences that 
extend well beyond forward-looking statements in OFRs and integrated reports that turn out 
to be untrue. Thus, we consider that this is likely to be the most difficult statutory amendment 
to have passed into law, as well as being the type of reform that would most reassure 
directors in relation to, inter alia, <IR> and OFRs.  
 
An alternative proposal for a new statutory business judgment rule provides a broad based 
defence for directors’ derivative liability for the conduct of corporations.130 This option, 
proposed by Bob Austin of Minter Ellison, entails a defence that would be inserted into the 
interpretation statutes that operate federally and in each state and territory, meaning it would 
apply to all statutes, including the Corporations Act.131 This proposal sets up a rebuttable 
presumption of no liability for business judgments, defined more broadly than the current 
statutory provision in s 180(3),132 which would shift the current onus of proof on directors 
under s 180(2) of the Act. Thus, the Austin/Minter Ellison proposal is broader than the AICD 
proposal as it would apply to all statutory obligations imposed on directors, but it is also more 
modest than the AICD proposal as it does not seek to dilute the strength of the objective test 
currently contained in s 180(1) Corporations Act.133 Either set of reforms, if adopted, are 
likely to go a long way towards allaying directors’ concerns about liability for forward-
looking statements in <IR>. 
 
                                                            
130 Austin B, “Boards that Lead Need Better Protection”, Australian Financial Review (21 March 2014) 
<www.afr.com>. 
131 See further, Harris J and Hargovan A, “Revisiting the Business Judgment Rule” (2014) Governance 
Directions, November 2014, 634. 
132 Under the Austin/Minter Ellison law reform proposal, business judgments are defined as ‘an exercise of 
judgment relating to taking or not taking action in connection with any business of the corporation’.  See further, 
Harris and Hargovan, n 125. 
133 Harris and Hargovan, n 125.  
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Part VII: The Desirability of Assuring OFRs and Integrated Reports 
If any of the above options are introduced to limit directors’ liability for forward-looking 
statements in OFRs and integrated reports, it is critical that mechanisms are implemented to 
ensure that reliance can nonetheless be placed on these forward-looking statements. One such 
safeguard is assurance of OFRs and integrated reports. As outlined by the IIRC, assurance is 
vitally important to <IR> because it is ‘a fundamental mechanism for ensuring reliability and 
enhancing credibility’.134 There are both practical challenges to assuring integrated reports, 
such as whether traditional assurance models and assurance providers will be an appropriate 
fit for <IR> and the cost of assurance, and technical challenges, such as the existence of 
suitable criteria, materiality issues, the level of assurance that is appropriate, and how to 
assure future-oriented information. The IIRC is currently involved in an international 
stakeholder consultation process concerning these types of issues.135  
 
Expectations of assurance are likely to arise in the context of integrated reports that are 
serving a double function as OFRs. Although RG 247 specifies that an OFR prepared under s 
299A of the Corporations Act is not required to be audited,136 OFRs and integrated reports 
that are part of the directors’ report fall under the rubric of ‘other information’ in a document 
that contains an audited financial report. Auditing Standard ASA 720 Other Information in 
Documents Containing Audited Financial Reports requires auditors to read the OFR and 
integrated report to ensure there are no material inconsistencies with the audited financial 
report and that the OFR and integrated report contains no material misstatements of fact. This 
is enforceable as section 307A of the Corporations Act specifies that audits of financial 
                                                            
134 International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), “Assurance on <IR>: An Exploration of Issues” (2014) 
http://www.theiirc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Assurance-on-IR-an-exploration-of-issues.pdf viewed 9 
October 2014. 
135 IIRC, n 128.  
136 ASIC, n 17 at [247.37]. 
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reports must be conducted in accordance with Australian auditing standards. An offence 
based on an auditor’s breach of s 307A is a strict liability offence. 
 
An additional consideration is that auditors may also soon have increased responsibilities to 
report on ‘key audit matters’, which include ‘significant risks identified by the auditor’, as 
outlined in the recently approved International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 701: 
Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report. In some 
circumstances, this could be conceived to extend to significant future risks described in 
forward-looking statements. It is expected that ISA 701 will be adopted by the Australian 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, consistent with its policy of convergence with 
international auditing standards, unless there are ‘compelling reasons’ not to do so.137 As 
outlined above, once this requirement is integrated into Australia Auditing Standards, it will 
be enforceable through s 307A of the Corporations Act.  
 
With the possibility of auditors becoming more involved in assuring OFRs and integrated 
reports, the issue of auditor liability needs to be considered. Similarly to the proposed 
broadening of the business judgment rule discussed above, some commentators have called 
for an “auditor judgment rule” that would provide a safe harbour for auditors who have made 
auditing judgments in good faith.138 Reflecting on the US context, Peecher, Solomon and 
Trotman argue that ‘auditors’ judgments, even if made in good faith, can be second-guessed 
                                                            
137 Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), “Principles of Convergence to International 
Standards of the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and Harmonisation with the 
Standards of the New Zealand Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (NZAuASB)” (2012) [3] 
http://www.auasb.gov.au/admin/file/content102/c3/Principles_of_convergence_and_harmonisation.pdf viewed 
9 October 2014. 
138 Peecher M E, Solomon I and Trotman K T, “An Accountability Framework for Financial Statement Auditors 
and Related Research Questions” (2013) 38 Accounting, Organizations and Society 596.   
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as courts can rule that alternative judgments should have been reached’.139 Accordingly, they 
argue for the development of an auditor judgment rule, which is modelled after the business 
judgment rule that applies to American corporate directors, and provides a safe harbour for 
auditors who ‘make judgments that are within their authority and for which there is a rational 
basis’.140 Alongside the types of additional legal protections for directors that we outlined 
above, an additional consideration is the concomitant development of these types of 
protections for auditors, particularly in the context of auditing forward-looking information in 
OFRs and integrated reports.  
 
Part VIII: Conclusion 
<IR> is an important international development for corporate reporting, and its uptake in 
Australia is likely to be welcomed by both shareholders and other stakeholders. Additionally, 
there are potentially numerous internal and external benefits for companies that adopt <IR>. 
However, unlike in other jurisdictions, there is particular concern amongst Australian 
business leaders that there are liability risks attached to adopting <IR>, which is hampering 
its uptake. This article has sought to illuminate the bases for these liability concerns. It has 
argued that there are many similarities between the OFR requirements in the Corporations 
Act and the requirements of <IR>, and that <IR> can be compared with an enhanced form of 
OFR reporting. From a practical perspective, this is significant as it means that many 
directors who are concerned about potential personal liability for forward-looking statements 
under corporations law are equating these fears with <IR>. Regardless of whether <IR> is 
adopted as a voluntary or mandatory measure, directors may be liable for misleading and 
deceptive statements, or breaches of directors’ duties. It is highly relevant to address these 
                                                            
139 Peecher, Solomon and Trotman, n 132 at 606. 
140 Peecher, Solomon and Trotman, n 131 at 605. 
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concerns of directors to promote the uptake of <IR> in Australia, which is likely to have 
benefits for companies and the wider community. 
 
Accordingly, this article has considered four possible reform options, ranging from acute 
remedies to address the issue of director sign-off of integrated reports in Australia to more 
far-reaching proposals for reform of the statutory business judgement rule in the 
Corporations Act, the consequences of which will extend well beyond <IR>. Perhaps the 
least intrusive option that will protect directors legally is for Australian companies to use the 
<IR> Framework in their reporting, thus reaping the benefits of this approach, but without 
referencing the Framework, and therefore not requiring TCWG to directly accept 
responsibility for forward-looking statements whose future veracity cannot be guaranteed. 
However, the <IR> liability debate in Australia appears to be feeding into wider debates 
about safe harbours for directors making forward-looking statements in Australia. To fully 
allay directors’ concerns in this regard, more far-reaching statutory reforms of sections 299A 
and/or the inclusion of a broad, overarching defence for directors in the Corporations Act 
may be necessary. If any of these proposed reforms are implemented to limit directors’ 
liability for forward-looking statements in OFRs and integrated reports, it is beneficial that 
mechanisms, such as external assurance, are utilised to ensure that reliance can nonetheless 
be placed on these forward-looking statements. The concomitant development of a legal safe 
harbour for auditors alongside legal protections for directors in relation to forward-looking 
information in OFRs and integrated reports is thus a further area for consideration.  
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Table 1: Australian Companies on GRI that Produced a Self-Claimed ‘Integrated’ 
Report in 2013 
 
Company Name of 
Report 
Reference to 
<IR> 
Framework 
Responsibility of 
TCWG 
Assurance 
Stockland 
Corporation 
Ltd 
2013 Annual 
Review 
Yes; <IR> 
pilot company 
Whole annual review 
signed off by 
Chairman, and the 
Managing Director 
and CEO  
Yes, by NetBalance 
 
Dexus 
 
2013 Annual 
Review 
 
No reference 
to <IR> 
Framework 
 
Whole annual review 
signed off by 
Chairman 
 
PwC provided limited 
assurance over selected 
data from Australia and 
NZ within the integrated 
online reporting suite 
SIMS Metal 
Management 
 
2013 Annual 
Report 
 
No reference 
to <IR> 
Framework 
Whole annual report 
signed off by 
Chairman  
Financial statement 
(included in report) 
audited by PwC 
National 
Australia 
Bank  
2013 Annual 
Review 
 
<IR> pilot 
 
Whole annual review 
signed off by 
Chairman  
EY provided limited 
assurance on Annual 
Review 
Insurance 
Australia 
Group 
 
2013 
Sustainability 
Report 
 
No reference 
to <IR> 
Framework 
 
Whole sustainability 
report signed off by 
Chairman and 
Managing Director 
NetBalance assured 
sustainability indicators 
to a limited level using 
ASA 3000  
GPT Group 
 
2013 
Sustainability 
Report 
 
No reference 
to <IR> 
Framework 
 
Statement that ‘The 
Board has ultimate 
responsibility for 
ensuring that the 
sustainability strategy 
conforms to GPT’s 
Sustainability Policy 
and that there are 
robust management 
system procedures in 
place for managing 
GPT’s key areas of 
sustainability risk and 
opportunity’ 
No 
 
  
